Genocide Determination Bill: what you need to know as this all-party Bill is considered for its Second Reading in Parliament, in The House of Lords, on Friday July 17th 2026. Time we got real about the Apex Crime – the crime above all crimes and which continues to be committed with impunity. Help us to persuade the Government that it’s time to stop looking away and time to act.

The Genocide Determination Bill will have its 2nd reading on 17th July.

Time we got real about the Apex Crime – the crime above all crimes which continues to be committed with impunity.

Read more about the bill and why its needed here:https://t.co/7eS7GXSQMA pic.twitter.com/yNi7lKlnJC

— Lord (David) Alton (@DavidAltonHL) July 7, 2026

On 17 July, the Genocide Determination Bill will have its second reading. Contact members of @UKHouseofLords and @HouseofCommons urging them to give it their support. @LordSpeaker @CommonsSpeaker @Keir_Starmer @andyburnham @YvetteCooperMP @DavidLammy @attorneygeneral @FCDOGovUK… pic.twitter.com/ozj87WUGot

— Lord (David) Alton (@DavidAltonHL) June 30, 2026

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House of Lords Debate Briefing

Genocide Determination Bill

Second Reading

17 July 2026

‘The UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide now seems, with hindsight, to be a deplorably weak instrument for dealing with the challenges we face today. It was indeed the first such treaty of the modern era, …  pointed out, but it is simply not up to the job.’

Lord Hope of Craighead (CB), HL Deb, 13 October 2020, c1037

This briefing is prepared for the House of Lords second reading of the Genocide Determination Bill on 17 July 2026.

Genocide Determination Bill

• The Genocide Determination Bill, introduced by Lord Alton of Liverpool, aims to establish a formal legal mechanism allowing British domestic courts to make preliminary determinations on whether a genocide is occurring or has occurred abroad.
• The Genocide Determination Bill is victim-centric in that it is to empower affected groups or representative organisations to apply for a judicial determination of genocide or the risk thereof and to trigger action.
• The High Court of England and Wales (and equivalent courts in Scotland and Northern Ireland) would then evaluate evidence and issue preliminary findings.
• Upon making a finding, the Secretary of State would be required to respond, including by referring the case to the International Criminal Court, the International Court of Justice or other international bodies.
• The overarching objective is to ensure that the UK Government acts quickly on its existing obligations under the Genocide Convention, which legally binds signatories to prevent mass atrocities the moment a serious risk is recognised.

This bill, including in its version as the Genocide Amendment to the Trade Bill 2021, were supported by cross party Parliamentarians in both Houses, including: Lord Hope of Craighead KT, Baroness Kennedy of the Shaws LT KC, Lord Hannay of Chiswick GCMG CH, Baroness Sugg CBE, Baroness Hodgson of Abinger CBE, Lord Collins of Highbury, Sir Iain Duncan Smith MP, Shabana Mahmood MP, Nus Ghani MP, among others.

This briefing focuses on:

• How the Bill implements the Government’s own policy;
• How the Bill is to operate;
• What international legal obligations it implements;
• What political commitments it implements;
• How it can address the crime of genocide.

1. Introduction

Despite the numerous political promises of ‘Never Again’ and the legal promise enshrined in the duty to prevent genocide and other atrocity crimes, such atrocities are not a crime of the past.

Genocide is an identity-based crime – it targets the group identity. Genocide, often referred to as the crime of crimes, is defined in Article II of the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention), as any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

To meet the legal definition of genocide, the atrocities are to be accompanied by the ‘specific intent’ to destroy in whole or in part one of the protected groups.

Since the adoption of the Genocide Convention, we have seen several cases of atrocity crimes which may meet the legal definition of genocide. However, they have been rarely formally determined as such. This is often because States, including the UK, do not have a formal process for making such a determination and/or rely on courts to make a determination, while also not having relevant laws to enable their courts to do so.

2. Genocide Determination Bill Implementing Government’s Own Policy

The Genocide Determination Bill was first introduced by Lord Alton in June 2016,^[1] only a few months after the House of Commons (HoC) made a determination of genocide against the Yazidis, Christians and other minorities, following a unanimous vote in the HoC.^[2] This was the first time the HoC made such a determination – and a determination of an ongoing genocide.

Despite the evidence in support, as relied upon by the HoC, the Government did not accept the determination made by the HoC, arguing that such a determination can be made by an international judicial body only – despite knowing too well that there was no international judicial body to make such a determination in the case of the crimes committed by Daesh in Syria and Iraq. The Government also made it very clear that it was not willing to move on this position, despite attempts, despite other governments with similar positions re-evaluating their stances and action on the evidence before them. [Over the years, the Government would sometimes rely on an international judicial body, sometimes, a competent domestic court – but has always been very clear – a political determination would not do.]

It was also this unwillingness of the Government to change its position and hide behind the ‘long-standing policy’ that made Lord Alton consider what would need to happen to implement the Government’s own policy.

If, indeed, the Government wanted a court determination, the question was: could UK domestic courts make such a determination?

As it stands, the only legislation pertaining to genocide was the International Criminal Court Act 2001 (ICCA 2001) – a legislation domesticating the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). This is legislation which enables British courts to prosecute individuals for their involvement in international crimes such as genocide.  So far so good. However, there were a few problems:

• First, the ICCA 2001 equips domestic courts with a very narrow jurisdiction over international crimes, namely, active personality jurisdiction – which means that the alleged perpetrators must be British citizens or residents to fall within the purview of the legislation. This limits the ability of courts to make a determination of genocide – an issue Parliamentarians have been challenging in recent years with the Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) recommendations^[3] and universal jurisdiction (UJ) amendments to the Crime and Policing Bill supported cross-party.^[4] By rejecting the UJ reforms, the Government yet again blocked a legislative reform to implement its own long-standing policy on genocide determination. In effect, in the majority of cases of possible genocide, as per the ICCA 2001, British courts could not engage and make such a determination.
• Second, such criminal prosecutions would follow the crime – mostly years after – as such, have no real value for prevention purposes [while it is accepted that prosecutions can help to prevent future atrocities.]
• Third, since the introduction of the ICCA in 2001, there have been no prosecutions for genocide in this country – and as it stands, there have been no developments to suggest that this may change anytime soon, despite several situations where there is evidence to suggest that genocide may be perpetrated. 

As such, despite the long-standing policy on genocide determination, the UK does not have legislative vehicles to implement it.

This is also why Lord Alton introduced the Genocide Determination Bill – to give effect to the Government’s long-standing policy, and by doing so, implementing the UK’s obligations under the Genocide Convention.

3. The Operation of the Genocide Determination Bill

The bill is very simple:

• Clause 1 provides for the High Court in England, Wales and Northern Ireland and the Court of Session in Scotland to make preliminary determinations of genocide or the serious risk of genocide under the Genocide Convention, following an application for victims/survivors and/or their representatives;
• Clause 2  introduces safeguards that are to ensure that the mechanism is not abused for frivolous and vexatious claims.
• Clause 3 ensures that the determination is acted upon, including by requiring the Secretary of State to refer such determinations to relevant international courts or organisations for further action.

To address the long-standing failure of the UK Government to deal with the issue of genocide determination, Lord Alton introduced the Genocide Determination Bill and the Genocide Amendments to the Trade Bill 2021. Both aimed to give the power to the High Court, enabling a neutral arbiter to consider the case and make an interim determination of genocide in line with long-standing Government policy. Subsequently, this determination would be used by the State to inform its responses.

The Genocide Determination Bill, despite coming up on the ballot a few times since 2016, was never given enough time to proceed through all stages of the Parliamentary process. In 2026, the bill came 8th in the ballot, and it will be debated over the subsequent months, with the 2nd reading on 17 July.

As the Genocide Determination Bill has not progressed yet, the only recent atrocity crimes-related legislative reform was in the form of Section 3 of the Trade Act 2021, which has been deemed by experts as unusable.

Section 3 of the Trade Act 2021

A version of the Genocide Determination Bill was introduced by Lord Alton as an amendment to the then Trade Bill 2021. Despite significant support in the House of Lords,^[5] including securing a majority of 126 (Contents: 308, Not Contents: 182),^[6] and after a heated ping-pong, the amendments (in their various forms) ultimately failed when the Neill Amendment (later referred to as the Section 3 mechanism) was adopted. The Section 3 mechanism allows a responsible committee of the House of Lords or the House of Commons to publish a report which ‘(a) states that there exist credible reports of genocide in the territory of a prospective FTA counter-party, and (b) confirms that, in preparing the report, the committee has taken such evidence as it considers appropriate.’ If, after receiving a response from the Secretary of State, the committee is not satisfied with the Secretary of State’s response, then it may set out the wording of a motion to be moved in the House of Commons. The Minister of the Crown must then make arrangements for the motion to be debated and voted on.

While the Section 3 mechanism appears to speak to the issue of a determination, the new mechanism ignores the fact that Parliamentary committees, such as the Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC), already have powers of assessment and recommendation. Arguably, the FAC considered the atrocities committed by Daesh against the Yazidis in its 2016 report,^[7] the atrocities committed by the Burmese military against the Rohingya in its 2017 report,^[8] and the CPP atrocities against the Uyghurs in its 2020 report; it is not clear whether the conclusions within would enable triggering the Section 3 mechanism.

Problematically, the Section 3 mechanism does not provide anything new and replaces a bill that would have substantially spoken to the issue of genocide determination to facilitate a meaningful response from the Government. Notably, the mechanism applies only to future bilateral free trade agreements. This means that no country with which the UK has an existing bilateral trade relationship, and in which there are currently credible allegations of genocide, will fall within its purview.

Furthermore, the Section 3 mechanism ignores the fact that Parliamentary committees have full discretion over which issues to examine (topics cannot be imposed upon committees), have limited capacities, and also take a long time to conduct their inquiries and adopt reports with recommendations. In 2021/2022, as the UK Government has been discussing a Free Trade Agreement with India, and Section 3 of the Trade Act 2021 became relevant. This is because of reports of attacks against Muslim communities in India, and calls, in December 2021, on their audience to kill Muslims or rape Muslim women and girls, which may amount to direct and public incitement to commit genocide.^[9] Despite such concerns, no relevant Parliamentary committee has assessed the situation to trigger Section 3 of the Trade Act 2021. There was also very little interest, as ‘India is an important trading partner’, an argument that enables one to get away with genocide, especially in the post-Brexit UK.

4. Genocide Determination Bill as a Vehicle to Implement UK’s Legal Obligations under the Genocide Convention

Article I of the Genocide Convention is clear that State Parties have two important obligations: a duty to prevent and a duty to punish perpetrators of the crime of genocide. However, the Genocide Convention itself does not clarify the precise nature and scope of how to implement them. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its 2007 judgment in Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro case (the 2007 judgment) states that the duty to prevent genocide is to be triggered when the State ‘learns of, or should normally have learned of, the existence of a serious risk that genocide will be committed.’^[10] The judgment further adds that ‘from that moment onwards, if the State has available to it means likely to have a deterrent effect on those suspected of preparing genocide, or reasonably suspected of harbouring specific intent (dolus specialis), it is under a duty to make such use of these means as the circumstances permit.’^[11] The State is to ‘employ all means reasonably available to them, so as to prevent genocide so far as possible.’^[12] This obligation is not limited to the territory of the State in question but extends outside its territory and critically to third States.^[13] As such, the 2007 ICJ judgment identifies the trigger point for the duty to prevent and how States are to implement their obligation under the Genocide Convention.

Considering the trigger point, as identified in the 2007 judgment, the question that follows is: how do States learn, or should have learned, of the serious risk of genocide? Is news reporting enough? A report by a scholar or a practitioner? A UN report?

Here, the important consideration is that the 2007 judgment does not engage with the issue of genocide determination (namely, whether genocide is being perpetrated) but the determination of the serious risk of genocide, which is by definition a prior consideration to the commission of genocide itself.^[14] Indeed, identifying the serious risk of genocide, in accordance with the duty to prevent, is not the same and has to be distinguished from 1) genocide determination and 2) determination of criminal accountability of an individual for his or her involvement in the genocide,^[15] a distinction which continues to be conflated and neglected in, for example, the UK Government’s responses that focus on the determination of criminal accountability of an individual for his or her involvement in the genocide.^[16] Identifying the serious risk of genocide is a crucial prerequisite to triggering the duty to prevent and ensure that the risk factors do not escalate and manifest as a full-blown genocide. Genocide determination refers to a determination made based on all evidence to inform the State’s responses. Determination of criminal accountability of an individual for his or her involvement in genocide is a determination made by a competent court in an individual case and related to the duty to punish the crime. Three very different considerations are often erroneously referred to under the same heading of genocide determination.

While not mandated by jurisprudence, to give effect to the legal principles and duty to prevent, States must have effective monitoring, analysis, and determination mechanisms in place to be able to identify the serious risk of genocide. It is hard to see how else a serious risk can be identified. Where States do not have such mechanisms, they may easily rely on the argument of the lack of relevant knowledge, and so evade their responsibility to act. This is contrary to the duty to prevent, the spirit of the Genocide Convention and international law relating to the violation of peremptory norms.

The question is then: does the UK have mechanisms to give effect to its duty to prevent genocide, including to identify the serious risk of genocide? Two mechanisms come to mind: the Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability (JACS) and the Atrocity Prevention Hub.

• JACS is not a specific framework for the analysis of atrocity crimes and should not be used as such. It was first in March 2021 that the guidance was updated to include a section on atrocity crimes. To this day, the document is not public, and as such, it is difficult to assess whether it is fit for purpose. However, it is noteworthy that the JACS, as originally published in 2017, is focused on conflict analysis and refers to frameworks focused on conflict only. The atrocity crimes assessment will not be conducted unless the situation falls within the purview of conflict or instability, which may never materialise in situations where there are mass atrocities but no armed conflict per se. For example, it appears that there has been no JACS assessment of the situations in China and India, despite the persecution of Muslim minorities in both countries.

Furthermore, there is no trigger for JACS, and it is unclear what the process is for deciding whether to proceed with a JACS assessment and when. For example, in November 2025, it also came to light that the last time the Government conducted the JACS assessment for Sudan was in 2019.^[17] Despite the escalation of the situation in Sudan over subsequent years, and despite the civil war that erupted in April 2023, no further assessment was undertaken by the UK Government. Considering the developments from the last three years, the 2019 JACS assessment is long out of date. It is concerning that the Government would rely on such an outdated analysis, despite significant change of circumstances. Furthermore, the 2019 JACS assessment would not include an assessment of atrocity crimes in Sudan, as this aspect of the JACS assessment was introduced a few years later. If the Government’s current responses rely on the 2019 assessment, it is not surprising that the responses are inadequate – as any recommendations from the 2019 assessment could not address a situation that does not exist anymore.

Beyond the above, the UK Government has failed to disclose what assessments they conduct and what frameworks for analysis of genocide or atrocity crimes they use.

• Around 2022, the Office for Conflict, Stabilisation and Mediation (OCSM) created a dedicated hub for prevention to design and test a comprehensive approach to upstream conflict and conflict-related atrocity prevention.^[18] The new mechanism, the Mass Atrocity Prevention Hub, was to be the central policy ownership of the UK Government’s approach to mass atrocity prevention in both non-conflict and conflict settings and working closely with thematic and geographic teams.^[19] Not much is known about the work of the Hub. However, at the end of 2025 – early 2026, with the FCDO undergoing significant reforms, reports suggested that the Hub was to disappear. So far, the Government refused to provide any information on the issue.

Neither of the mechanisms enables the analysis of the serious risk of genocide. Furthermore, as neither of the mechanisms is a ‘competent court’, they cannot implement the UK Government’s long-standing policy. As such, their existence does not change the need to introduce legal vehicles to give effect to the UK’s long-standing policy, and in turn, the UK’s obligations under international law.

5. Genocide Determination Bill Implementing the UK’s Political Commitments

Prevention and protection are also part of the UK’s political commitments, whether in the Responsibility to Protect or Recommendation 7 of the Bishop of Truro Review.

Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

Under the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle, states are under a duty to protect their populations from genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing; and this responsibility includes:

the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means… The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.^[20]

Similarly, the international community has the responsibility to:

use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.^[21]

Despite these duties, one of the main issues continues to be the glaring gap between the accepted obligations and their implementation and enforcement. States simply do not have domestic mechanisms that would enable them to stop such atrocities or to pre-emptively intervene to avert them. To fulfil their obligations, states must have effective and comprehensive atrocity prevention mechanisms in place. States do not necessarily need comprehensive atrocity prevention mechanisms as a matter of law, but clearly, that might in reality be the only way they can fulfil the expansive nature of the duty. Currently, only a few states in the world have such mechanisms, and even they have only introduced them in the last decade.^[22] And even those few countries with mechanisms that should enable them to prevent genocide rarely act upon the early warning signs.

Recommendation 7 of the Bishop of Truro Review

Because of this glaring failure and lack of any comprehensive mechanisms that could give effect to the obligation to prevent genocide and atrocity crimes, the then Bishop of Truro, Philip Mounstephen, in his independent review of the FCO/FCDO’s responses to the persecution of Christians globally, included an important recommendation aimed at rectifying the current failure. Recommendation 7 requires the FCDO to:

Ensure that there are mechanisms in place to facilitate an immediate response to atrocity crimes, including genocide, through activities such as setting up early warning mechanisms to identify countries at risk of atrocities, diplomacy to help de-escalate tensions and resolve disputes, and developing support to help with upstream prevention work. Recognising that the ultimate determination of genocide must be legal, not political and respecting the UK’s long-held policy in this area, the FCO should nonetheless determine its policy in accordance with the legal framework and should be willing to make public statements condemning such atrocities.^[23]

The implementation of this recommendation was reviewed in 2022. According to the independent review of the FCDO’s implementation of the Bishop of Truro Review recommendations, Recommendation 7 on atrocity prevention is ‘in the process of being delivered’ through a range of promising initiatives. The review states that ‘the FCDO has, recently, initiated new early warning mechanisms to identify countries at risk of instability, conflict, and atrocities.’^[24] This must refer to the 2021 amended JACS assessment.^[25] The review further stated that ‘There are also examples of diplomatic engagement with a view to de-escalating tensions and resolving disputes in specific contexts, alongside development and programmatic support with the aim of addressing root causes of conflict.’^[26] The review further states that:

FoRB has been included as a factor in ongoing reporting and analyses and has been considered alongside other relevant conflict and violence risk factors. However, a dedicated early warning mechanism that focuses on FoRB-related conflict has not been developed despite the broader context of the Recommendation appearing to contemplate this.^[27]

The review also stated that ‘Some interviewees observed that this Recommendation could not be advanced in the absence of additional specific mechanisms focused on the assessment of atrocity crimes outside of contexts of instability and conflict.’^[28] And indeed, the UK Government’s focus is on conflict, failing to realise that such atrocity crimes as genocide are also perpetrated outside of conflict scenarios. The Atrocity Prevention Hub was established shortly after. However, while both developments were welcome, neither of them is able to implement the UK’s long-standing policy of a competent court dealing with the determination of genocide.

6. How the Genocide Determination Bill Can Respond to Genocide?

Determination of genocide is the first but key step to ensure comprehensive responses to genocide, in line with the legal obligations under the Genocide Convention or political commitments in line with the R2P and the Truro Review.

This section focuses on a few examples of recent genocidal atrocities which have not received comprehensive attention and response and where the steps stipulated in Clause 3 could be triggered to respond to the crimes.

1.      Yazidis, Iraq

In April 2016, the UK House of Commons recognised the atrocities committed by Daesh against religious minorities as genocide. The Government did not follow through on the recognition. First, in August 2023, (six years after the HoC determination of genocide), after three determinations of genocide by German criminal courts, the UK Government formally recognised the genocide. However, no actions followed.

On 3 August 2014, members of the terror organisation Daesh (commonly referred to as Islamic State or ISIL) launched a violent attack against Yazidis, an ethno-religious minority group, in Sinjar, Iraq. Daesh targeted the group as it perceived them as ‘infidels’ and ‘devil-worshipers.’ Daesh fighters killed hundreds, if not thousands, of men.^[29] As part of the same campaign, Daesh fighters abducted boys to turn them into child soldiers and women and girls for sex slavery. Thousands of women and girls are still missing, and their fate is unknown. A few days after the attack on Sinjar, Daesh also attacked the Nineveh Plains and forced over 120,000 people to flee for their lives in the middle of the night. Daesh committed murder, enslavement, deportation and forcible transfer of population, imprisonment, torture, abduction of women and children, exploitation, abuse, rape, sexual violence and forced marriage.^[30] The atrocities have been recognised, at an international level, as crimes against humanity, war crimes and even genocide.^[31] The number of those killed by Daesh is still not known. Mass graves continue to be discovered several years after the atrocities.

The events of 2014 can only be described as genocide.^[32] In August 2023, the UK Government formally recognised the atrocities as genocide, following court determinations in Germany.^[33]

As genocide does not occur overnight, it is clear that the risk factors and early warning signs of the atrocities were there long before the atrocities. The question would be whether they were suggestive of a serious risk of genocide. Another question would be whether the UK Government knew or should have known about it at the time, and how this affects the UK’s duties under the Genocide Convention.

It will never be possible to analyse all the evidence available to the UK Government at the time. However, even with this limitation, it is clear that the UK Government knew or should have known of the serious risk of genocide. For example, three years before the genocidal atrocities, in 2011, the UK Border Agency published a report on the situation in Iraq,^[34] which identified deadly attacks on religious minorities, especially during religious gatherings. ^[35] This included kidnapping and murder, both of which were carried out with impunity. Armed groups attacked Christian, Yazidi, and Shabak communities, labelling them crusaders, devil-worshipers, and infidels.^[36] Such labelling of groups with names such as crusaders and devil-worshipers aims to dehumanise them to make it easier for the perpetrators to justify their annihilation. The report further raised the issues of a lack of protection and inadequate government response to such targeting:

Lacking militias and tribal structures to defend themselves, a disproportionate number have fled the country. Although the government publicly condemns violence against minority groups, it has not taken sufficient measures to bolster security in areas where minorities are particularly vulnerable to attacks, and community leaders say that attacks are almost never thoroughly investigated. Iraqi security forces rarely apprehend, prosecute, and punish perpetrators of such attacks, which has created a climate of impunity.^[37]

The UK Government had this data as early as 2011. If there were a domestic mechanism to do the assessment and if it were reviewed by a person with expertise in atrocity prevention, it could have raised the alarm and triggered a formal assessment of the serious risk of genocide. Such an assessment would, most likely, confirm the finding of a serious risk of genocide.

However, the risk factors of atrocities were evident even before the damning report of 2011. After the fall of the former regime, individuals and armed groups used the power vacuum to further their agenda.^[38] Over the ensuing years, sporadic incidents of violence turned into organised and systematic attacks. As such, the serious risk of genocide may have been there even before 2011 and should have been identified if only this data were being collected and assessed by an expert in atrocity prevention in accordance with specialised frameworks for analysis of atrocity crimes.

Despite that, ultimately, in August 2023, the UK Government formally recognised the atrocities against the Yazidis as genocide, no Article I actions followed. To the contrary, shortly after the formal determination, the UK Government abandoned the accountability initiative which the UK initially led – UNITAD.

If, as stipulated in Clause 1 of the Genocide Determination Bill, a determination of genocide was made, Clause 3 actions could include:

• Engaging the UN to establish a transitional mechanism to continue the work of UNITAD and/or enable existing UN mechanisms to continue this work;
• Initiating proceedings before the International Court of Justice against one of the countries most responsible for the Yazidi genocide, among others.

2. Darfur, Sudan

Darfur is currently experiencing a second genocide in two decades, yet again, without any adequate responses. Initially, the UK Government recognised the 2003-2006 Darfur genocide. However, in 2023, as there was already a serious risk of yet another genocide, the UK Government removed that determination. No comprehensive responses followed.

In November 2023, a group of 70 international law experts published an open letter warning about the risk of genocide in Darfur, Sudan. As they state:

The risk of imminent genocidal mass killing is now approaching a point of no return as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the paramilitary group in conflict with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), is on the verge of taking over the entire Darfur region after capturing four of its five states.^[39]

The civil war in Sudan, which erupted in April 2023, resulted in more than 10,000 people being killed, 4.5 million people being internally displaced, and a further 1.2 million, mostly women and girls, fleeing to neighbouring countries, including Chad.^[40] As indicated by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), more than twenty-five million people in Sudan (or close to half of the population) require humanitarian assistance. The humanitarian situation is dire and continues to deteriorate. For example, as indicated by the UN, in White Nile State, the surge in displacement has ‘overwhelmed essential services in the refugee camps, noting also that, like in the rest of Sudan, schools have been shut for the last seven months as displaced people find temporary shelter inside the classrooms. The health situation is also particularly alarming, with over 1,200 children under five having died in the province between mid-May and mid-September due to a measles outbreak combined with high levels of malnutrition, and at least four children are dying every week, as essential medicines, personnel, and supplies are lacking.’^[41] Dominique Hyde, Director of External Relations at UNHCR, commented that: ‘The war that erupted without warning turned previously peaceful Sudanese homes into cemeteries.’^[42]

Against this background, experts warn of a serious risk of genocide in Darfur. In April 2023, the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Sudan and South Sudan, a cross-party group of politicians in the UK Parliament, published a report on the situation in Darfur. The report found that ‘the new waves of violence [since 2021] include killings, the use of rape and sexual violence, torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, the use of child soldiers, and attacks on internally displaced person camps, among others. These crimes have all hallmarks of atrocity crimes and embody early warning signs of further atrocities.’^[43] In August 2023, UN experts reported on the brutal and widespread use of rape and other forms of sexual violence by the RSF and identified women and girls held in chains in ‘slave-like conditions’ under RSF control in Darfur.^[44] In November 2023, CNN described one woman belonging to the Masalit tribe who testified how ‘her captor received money in exchange for her enslavement in the brothel — up to 7,000 Sudanese pounds, the equivalent of $10.’^[45] She told CNN how she was called by her captor ‘a slave’ and ‘dirt.’ CNN explained that ‘in Arabic, the word for ‘slave’ is a racial slur equivalent to the n-word.’^[46] This is not an isolated case, and survivors have been testifying to the RSF’s campaign of widespread and systematic attacks against civilians and deliberate targeting of non-Arab ethnic groups for mass killing, enslavement, sexual violence, and torture.

The evidence of persecution and killings based on ethnicity is well-established. As the authors of the public letter indicate:

In recent weeks, the RSF has become increasingly brazen in its attacks and brutality against civilians, particularly targeting the Masalit ethnic group directly. Earlier this month, in just six days, RSF forces terrorised an IDP camp in Ardamata, a site thought to be a place of refuge from prior attacks, massacring hundreds and enslaving members of the Masalit. This follows the RSF unleashing the same horrors on El Geneina earlier this year, leaving hastily dug mass graves for members of the Masalit community. According to survivors of these massacres, the RSF and its militiamen singled out Masalit for execution and further hunted down prominent leaders of the community.^[47]

Furthermore, the authors of the letter added:

There is now an imminent risk that the RSF will continue committing war crimes and crimes against humanity in El Fasher, where the number of victims at risk is even more catastrophic and where hundreds of thousands are sheltering with no safe passage out. With no more realistic safe havens left, non-Arab ethnic groups in El Fasher are the most unprotected, at-risk, and vulnerable IDP population in Darfur.^[48]

Whole generations of Darfurians still remember the genocide of 2003. Two decades later, they live through it yet again.

The ICC has jurisdiction over the situation in Darfur, Sudan, and, as confirmed by the ICC Prosecutor, the OTP is also looking into the recent atrocities.^[49] However, the scope of the ICC inquiry is very narrow and limited to Darfur only, leaving the rest of Sudan outside the focus of the investigation.

In December 2025, the Standing Group on Atrocity Crimes, working with experts, issued an urgent briefing on the situation in Sudan, calling for action.^[50] As the briefing noted:

Sudan has been devastated by decades of conflict, with almost no accountability for alleged perpetrators and no meaningful structural reforms, mechanisms for reconciliation, or reparations processes underway. Sudan is now facing a new wave of atrocities. The UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan (UN IFFMS) described Sudan’s crisis as ‘a war of atrocities.’⁷ Across Darfur and the Kordofan, the RSF and its auxiliaries are intensifying implementation of a violent and discriminatory strategy to destroy and displace civilian communities because of their actual or perceived identity.⁸ This violence represents a continuation of the genocidal violence from two decades ago. In areas where the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) hold control, incidents of deliberate violence against civilians are also intensifying and should be expected to keep worsening as governmental forces seek to consolidate their political base.⁹ These atrocities must not be understood as collateral damage nor unintended consequences of war, but rather as central to the strategic implementation of the political objectives of both parties. Perceived impunity and inaction in the face of mass atrocity crimes have emboldened both RSF and SAF leadership and their backers.

The almost three years of renewed conflict in Sudan have seen extensive evidence of atrocity crimes, which resulted in several organisations issuing warnings of the serious risk of genocide.¹⁰ On 26 October 2025, after eighteen months of siege, El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, fell to the paramilitary RSF, following days of bombardment and the withdrawal of the SAF and allied groups. The takeover of El Fasher resulted in large-scale atrocity crimes, including targeted ethnic violence, extrajudicial killings and executions.¹¹ As no independent organisations have been able to access El Fasher so far, it is not possible to address the true scale and nature of the situation in the city. 

On 30 October 2025, the UN Security Council convened a special session focused on the situation in Sudan.¹² During the session, the UN Security Council heard reports of RSF’s attacks against the civilian population, including summary executions and arbitrary detentions, but also evidence suggesting the heightened risk of large-scale atrocities, including ethnically-motivated atrocities. Members of the UN Security Council called for all perpetrators of violations to be held accountable. They demanded that all parties to the conflict protect civilians and abide by their obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law, and fulfil UN Security Council Resolution 2736 (2024), as well as abide by their commitments under the Jeddah Declaration.  UN Security Council Resolution 2736 demanded that the RSF halt the siege of El Fasher; and an immediate halt to the fighting and for de-escalation in and around the city. It further called upon all parties to the conflict to ensure the protection of civilians, and to allow and facilitate the rapid, safe, unhindered and sustained passage of humanitarian relief for civilians in need.¹³ The Jeddah Declaration, an agreement facilitated by the United States and Saudi Arabia, was meant to provide for a ceasefire and enable the distribution of humanitarian aid.¹⁴

The situation in Darfur has been subject to an investigation by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) ever since the situation was referred to the ICC by the UN Security Council in 2005.¹⁵ The ICC has jurisdiction over alleged genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity committed in Darfur, Sudan, since 1 July 2002.¹⁶ As confirmed by the ICC Prosecutor, the investigation includes within its scope the ongoing atrocities.¹⁷ The situation is also being monitored by the FFMS, established by the UN Human Rights Council in October 2023. The most recent FFMS report not only contained troubling findings as to the atrocities in Sudan, but also included an urgent call for accountability efforts, including by expanding the jurisdiction of the ICC;  supporting the establishment of an independent and impartial judicial institution for Sudan; using the principle of universal jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute alleged perpetrators in national courts; imposing targeted sanctions against those responsible; and funding victim support and interim reparatory mechanisms, among others.¹⁸ 

Following a special session on Sudan, the UN Human Rights Council adopted a resolution directing the FFMS to produce a report on the situation in El Fasher for the 61st session of the UN Human Rights Council (23 February – 2 April 2026).¹⁹ While the ICC and the FFMS can document the atrocities, identify perpetrators, and take steps towards future justice and accountability efforts, neither can take any urgent action that could protect civilians now from the ongoing and escalating atrocities. Although the FFMS may include recommendations in its report, the report will not be available before the 61st session of the HRC, some three months away, and the inclusion of such recommendations does not mean, nor necessitate, multilateral action.  

Furthermore, while the heightened focus on El Fasher is welcome, experts warn that the next weeks and months are expected to see further escalation in atrocities elsewhere in Darfur and other parts of Sudan.²⁰ As such, the recommendations that the FFMS will propose for El Fasher, as per the already agreed UN Human Rights Council Resolution, may not respond to the reality on the ground at the time they are released.  

Efforts are underway by the United States, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (the ‘Quad’) to negotiate a humanitarian ceasefire, at a minimum, in order to bring a pause to the fighting to allow for humanitarian aid and a reprieve for civilians living under almost three years of intense fighting.²¹ The SAF, however, rejected the most recent proposal from November 2025, with Sudan’s army chief, General Abdelfattah al-Burhan, stating that ‘The solution is military.’²² This rhetoric is a further warning that the conflict will continue and that urgent measures, with credible backing, are needed to protect civilians and compel parties to bring the war to an end.  

On 12 December 2025, the UN published a news report with a title suggesting that a deal was struck to enable access to El Fasher.²³ However, the article does not provide further information on what this deal meant.²⁴  Furthermore, other reports suggest that calls to ensure access to El Fasher were ongoing as concerns about the well-being of the people in the city were ever-growing.²⁵

In February 2026, the UN IFFMM released a damning report on the atrocities in El-Fasher, concluding that the RSF’s siege and takeover of El Fasher bear the hallmarks of genocide.^[51]

In this report, the UN IFFMM concluded that the conduct of the RSF and allied militias demonstrated ‘hallmarks of genocide’ against non-Arab communities, particularly the Zaghawa and Fur populations. The report documented an 18-month siege during which civilians were deliberately deprived of food, water, medical care and humanitarian assistance, while being subjected to repeated shelling, attacks on displacement camps, and restrictions on movement designed to prevent escape. The Mission found that these conditions were ‘calculated to bring about the physical destruction’ of targeted groups, and that the cumulative pattern of killings, starvation, ethnic persecution and sexual violence reflected a coordinated and systematic campaign rather than isolated abuses.^[52]

The report further detailed mass executions, widespread rape and other forms of sexual violence, enforced disappearances, torture and arbitrary detention committed during and after the RSF takeover of El Fasher in October 2025. Survivors consistently described ethnically targeted attacks accompanied by exterminatory rhetoric, including explicit statements by perpetrators expressing intent to ‘eliminate’ or ‘destroy’ Zaghawa and Fur communities. The Mission concluded that at least three underlying acts of genocide were present: the killing of members of protected groups, the causing of serious bodily and mental harm, and the deliberate infliction of conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction, in whole or in part. It additionally found evidence of crimes against humanity and war crimes, including extermination, persecution, starvation and attacks against civilians and medical facilities. The report warned that the atrocities in El Fasher represented an escalation of earlier patterns of violence in Darfur and underscored the urgent need for international action to prevent further atrocity crimes, ensure accountability, and strengthen civilian protection mechanisms. Without prevention and accountability, the report warned that the risk of further genocidal acts remains ‘acute’.^[53]

If, as stipulated in Clause 1 of the Genocide Determination Bill, a determination of genocide was made, Clause 3 actions could include:

• Engaging the UN Security Council on a referral of the situation in Sudan to the ICC, equipping the ICC to investigate the situation in the whole of Sudan.

3. Uyghurs, Xinjiang

In April 2021, the UK House of Commons recognised the atrocities against the Uyghurs as genocide. The UK Government did not follow the recognition.

The Chinese government stands accused of genocide and crimes against humanity against the Uyghurs and other Turkic minorities in the Xinjiang region of China. Reports of such atrocities have been published by leading experts in the field. The Chinese government denies any wrongdoing.

Among others, in March 2021, Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy published a report co-authored by over 50 global experts in human rights, war crimes and international law, analysing the situation of the Uyghur community in Xinjiang against the legal definition of genocide and the duties to prevent and punish the crime of genocide. The report concludes that the Chinese government ‘bears State responsibility for committing genocide against the Uyghurs in breach of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.’^[54]

In November 2021, the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum’s Simon-Skjodt Centre for the Prevention of Genocide published its new report ‘“To Make Us Slowly Disappear”: The Chinese Government’s Assault on the Uyghurs,’ providing its assessment of the situation of Uyghurs in Xinjiang.^[55] The report concludes that the Chinese government may be committing genocide against the Uyghurs. Furthermore, according to its findings, the Chinese government is failing in its legal obligation to prevent the crime of genocide. The report confirms that publicly available information indicates that the Chinese authorities have caused serious mental and bodily harm to members of the Uyghur community through:

The forced sterilisation of Uyghur women; the forced placement of IUDs; the detention of members of the Uyghur community; the physical abuse of detainees; the forced separation of Uyghur families, including children, whether by transfer or detention; and the forced labour extracted from Uyghurs held in detention, as well as those recently released or otherwise not detained.^[56]

Further, the report indicates the use of rape and sexual violence as yet another way of causing serious or bodily harm to the members of the community. The report identifies several ways the community is subjected to measures intended to prevent births within the group, including: ‘forced sterilisation of Uyghur women, and the forced or otherwise coerced implantation of IUDs in circumstances where they cannot be removed without surgical intervention approved by the state.’ These methods are said to be leading to the slow disappearance of the community from Xinjiang.

In December 2021, the Uyghur Tribunal, an independent inquiry, published its findings stating that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has committed genocide, crimes against humanity and torture against Uyghur, Kazakh and other ethnic minority citizens in the north-west region of China.^[57] The Uyghur Tribunal found that:

Torture of Uyghurs attributable to the PRC is established beyond a reasonable doubt. Crimes against humanity attributable to the PRC are established beyond reasonable doubt by acts of deportation or forcible transfer; imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty; torture; rape and other sexual violence; enforced sterilisation; persecution; enforced disappearance; and other inhumane acts.^[58]

The Uyghur Tribunal further added that it ‘it is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the PRC, by the imposition of measures to prevent births intended to destroy a significant part of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang as such, has committed genocide.’

Again, the allegations continue to be denied by the Chinese government, as classified as anti-China propaganda. The Chinese government’s official position is that Uyghurs are subjected to counter-terrorism and deradicalisation measures.

In September 2021, Michelle Bachelet, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, said at the opening of the UN Human Rights Council that her Office was ‘finalising its assessment of the available information on allegations of serious human rights violations in that region, with a view to making it public.’ The report was ultimately published on 31 August 2022 and found that ‘the information currently available to [Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights] on implementation of the Government’s stated drive against terrorism and ‘extremism’ in [Xinjiang] in the period 2017- 2019 and potentially thereafter, also raises concerns from the perspective of international criminal law. The extent of arbitrary and discriminatory detention of members of Uyghur and other predominantly Muslim groups, pursuant to law and policy, in the context of restrictions and deprivation more generally of fundamental rights enjoyed individually and collectively, may constitute international crimes, in particular crimes against humanity.’^[59]

In 2022, civil society organisations filed a criminal complaint in Argentina under the universal jurisdiction provisions, as set out in Article 118 of the Argentinian Constitution, which allows for complaints concerning international crimes to be tried by any domestic court in the country.

If the Argentine court makes the determination of genocide against the Uyghurs, the UK Government will have to make a formal determination of genocide, in line with its long-standing policy. However, as in the case of Yazidi genocide, such a determination may not be followed by any decisive steps.

If, as stipulated in Clause 1 of the Genocide Determination Bill, a determination of genocide was made, Clause 3 actions could include:

• Engaging the UN Security Council to refer the situation to the ICC. Highly likely, such a resolution would have been blocked by China exercising a veto right. However, as a matter of principle, such a referral should at least be attempted.
• Engaging the UN General Assembly or the Human Rights Council to establish an investigative body to collect and preserve the evidence of the crimes, akin to IIIM or IIMM.

4. Tigray, Ethiopia

The atrocities in Tigray, Ethiopia have not received any significant domestic or international focus. JACS was conducted in 2022; however, its results are unknown.

The issue of genocide or the serious risk of genocide in Tigray, Ethiopia, has not received international attention yet. However, there is some evidence to suggest that the risk factors are there.

In March 2021, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken classified the atrocities in Western Tigray as ethnic cleansing. In November 2021, Genocide Watch issued a genocide warning for Ethiopia in relation to ‘the Ethiopian government’s persecution of the Tigrayan people in its war with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).’^[60] As the statement suggested:

The ENDF and its Eritrean allies and Amhara militias, as well as the TPLF, have carried out mass rape with the explicit aims of “cleansing the bloodlines” of the Tigrayan and Amhara people. Both sides have committed ethnic-based massacres of hundreds of civilians. Because both sides target each other based on ethnic identity and intentionally destroy significant parts of ethnic groups, both sides are committing genocide. The civil war has created a humanitarian emergency in Tigray. The Ethiopian government has intentionally blocked food supplies to Tigray, using access to food aid as a weapon of war. This is a war crime.^[61]

In December 2021, the US Holocaust Memorial Museum published a statement about the risk of genocide in Ethiopia, identifying that:

multiple warning signs of potential genocide against the Tigray people are present: reports of massacres and other targeted killings of Tigrayan civilians, dehumanisation and hate speech encouraging violence against members of the group, mass arrests and arbitrary detention, and possible collective punishment in the form of a human-made famine in the Tigray region.^[62]

In April 2022, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International published their joint report ‘We Will Erase You from This Land’ finding that ‘new administrators in the Western Tigray zone, as well as regional officials and security forces from Ethiopia’s Amhara region, are responsible for a campaign of ethnic cleansing, carried out through crimes against humanity and war crimes, targeting Tigrayan civilians in Western Tigray since the war began in November 2020.’^[63]

Among others, the use of sexual violence in conflict (CRSV) may be used as a prohibited act to bring about the destruction in whole or in part, as per Article II of the Genocide Convention. ‘I didn’t know if they realised I was a person’ were the words spoken by a woman who survived multiple rapes in Western Tigray, and the title of the 2021 Amnesty International report that details the disturbing sexual violence faced by many in the region.^[64] The same report identified that CRSV, in the context of the conflict, ‘has been accompanied by shocking levels of brutality, including beatings, death threats, and ethnic slurs. (…) It is often accompanied by threats and by additional acts of physical and psychological torture aimed at causing lasting fear, and physical and psychological damage.’ The report identified the perpetrators as ‘troops fighting in support of the federal government [including members of the EDF, the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF), the Amhara Regional Police Special Forces (ASF), and Fano, an informal Amhara militia group.’

In September 2023, the Tigray Inquiry published a report indicating that Tigrayans have been subjected to horrific atrocities during the war in the region between November 2020 and November 2022.^[65] Many of these atrocities are continuing to this day. Among the submissions received by the Inquiry, mass killings, sexual violence, and starvation were the most commonly identified crimes. The atrocities have not received enough international focus despite the war being one of the deadliest in recent years, and the atrocities meeting the legal definition of international crimes.

Despite the ceasefire in November 2022, the situation of the communities is still dire. The ceasefire may have stopped the guns, but atrocities continue to be committed, including rape and sexual violence. The communities continue to face a humanitarian crisis which claims lives to this day. The destruction brought about by the war means that the communities will continue to feel the effects of the war for months and years to come.

The situation in Tigray requires urgent international attention. So far, this has not been forthcoming despite the horrific reports of atrocity crimes in the region.

As the Inquiry was finalising this report, information on the dire situation in Ethiopia continued to circulate. On 29 August 2023, the UN reported that in the Amhara region, following a flare-up in clashes between the Ethiopian military and the regional Fano militia, and the declaration of a state of emergency on 4 August 2023, the situation worsened considerably.^[66] The UN reported that at least 183 people have been killed in clashes since July 2023. The state of emergency introduced in August 2023 equipped the Ethiopian government with broad powers to arrest without a court order, impose curfews and ban public gatherings. According to the UN, within four weeks of August 2023, more than 1,000 people have been arrested in Ethiopia, including many young Amharas suspected of Fano support. At least three journalists covering the situation in the Amhara region were arrested.

In September 2023, the International Commission of Experts on Ethiopia published their report for the 54th session of the Human Rights Council, stating that ‘the conflict in Tigray has not ended, with Eritrean troops and Amhara militias engaging in ongoing violations.’^[67] Past and current abuses in these four regions demand further investigation. The Government of Ethiopia has failed to investigate violations effectively and has initiated a flawed transitional justice consultation process. Ethiopia has sought to evade international scrutiny through the creation of domestic mechanisms ostensibly to fight impunity.

If, as stipulated in Clause 1 of the Genocide Determination Bill, a determination of genocide was made, Clause 3 actions could include:

• Engaging the UN to establish an investigative body to collect and preserve the evidence of the crimes, akin to IIIM or IIMM;
• Initiating proceedings before the International Court of Justice against Ethiopia and/or Eritrea for violations of the Genocide Convention;
• Engaging the UN Security Council to refer the situation to the ICC. 

5. Hazara, Afghanistan

The situation in Afghanistan is currently being considered by the ICC; however, the atrocities against the Hazara are not yet being considered, with the ICC prioritising the issue of gender persecution.

On 3 September 2022, the Hazara Inquiry, a joint effort of cross-party Parliamentarians from both Houses and experts working together to reveal atrocities and promote justice for the Hazara in Afghanistan and Pakistan, published their report on the situation of the Hazara in Afghanistan.^[68] The report, focusing on the situation of the Hazara in Afghanistan since 2021, finds that Hazara in Afghanistan, as a religious and ethnic minority, are at serious risk of genocide at the hands of the Islamic State–Khorasan Province (IS-K) and the Taliban. This finding engages the responsibility of all states to protect the Hazara and prevent a possible genocide, under the Genocide Convention and customary international law.

When the Taliban took control of Afghanistan in 2021, it significantly affected the situation faced by the Hazara and reversed the 20-year progress made in addressing the marginalisation and discrimination experienced by this minority group. The return to power of the Taliban has included brutal acts of violence against the Hazara throughout Afghanistan and a return to terror.

The first half of 2022 has seen hundreds of members of the Hazara community killed and many more injured as a result of the targeted attacks, including bombings of Hazara schools, places of worship and other centres. As the report was being finalised in August 2022, IS-K claimed responsibility for several attacks that resulted in over 120 fatalities within a few days. On 30 September 2022, a suicide attack inside the Kaaj Educational Centre in the Dasht-e-Barchi district of West Kabul, Afghanistan, claimed the lives of over 50 girls and young women belonging to the Hazara community.^[69] Over 100 others were injured in the attack. The attack was perpetrated as students had been sitting for a practice university exam. No group has claimed responsibility for the attacks as yet. The attacks against the community continue to this day.

The situation in Afghanistan is subject to an investigation by the ICC.^[70] However, for now, the issue of the atrocities against the Hazara has not received enough attention. The ICC is currently looking into the situation of women in Afghanistan, which is classified as gender persecution and considered as such. The ICC has issued at least two arrest warrants for the crimes.

If, as stipulated in Clause 1 of the Genocide Determination Bill, a determination of genocide was made, Clause 3 actions could include:

• Initiating proceedings before the International Court of Justice against Afghanistan for violations of the Genocide Convention;
• Engaging the ICC to initiate investigations into the issue of Hazara genocide.

7. Recommendations

To be equipped to fulfil their international legal obligations and political commitments, States must introduce significant changes to their approach to atrocity prevention. To help the UK to come closer to where it should be in terms of prevention and responses to atrocity crimes, and also to implement its own long-standing policy, the UK must adopt the Genocide Determination Bill.

Contact:

Dr Ewelina U. Ochab, IBAHRI senior programme lawyer, co-founder of the Coalition for Genocide Response  (ewelina.ochab@int-bar.org)

---

^[1]  Genocide Determination Bill [HL], 10 June 2016. Available at: https://bills.parliament.uk/bills/1826.

^[2] HoC, Debate, Genocide of Minorities, 20 April 2016. Available at: https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2016-04-20/debates/16042036000001/DaeshGenocideOfMinorities.

^[3] JCHR, Accountability for Daesh crimes (2025). Available at: https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/47848/documents/250062/default/.

^[4] HoL, Crime and Policing Bill, Committee Stage, 5 February 2026. Available at: https://hansard.parliament.uk/lords/2026-02-05/debates/F8A140AE-1D30-4B1B-B027-9191E7FCC438/CrimeAndPolicingBill.

^[5] Amendment 9 to the Trade Bill. See: https://bills.parliament.uk/bills/2729/stages/12454/amendments/72479.

^[6]  See: https://votes.parliament.uk/Votes/Lords/Division/2400.

^[7] FAC, Never Again: The UK’s Responsibility to Act on Atrocities in Xinjiang and Beyond (2021). Available at: https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/6624/documents/71430/default/.

^[8] See: FAC, Violence in Rakhine State and the UK’s Response (2017). Available at: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmfaff/435/435.pdf.

^[9] Panel of Independent International Experts to examine information about alleged violations of international law committed against Muslims in India since July 2019. Available at: https://www.ufs.ac.za/docs/librariesprovider21/default-document-library/piie-report-final.pdf?sfvrsn=624e4920_0.

^[10] Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) Judgment 26 February 2007, 431. Available at: https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/91/judgments.

^[11] Ibid.

^[12] Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) Judgment 26 February 2007, 430:

‘In this area the notion of ‘due diligence’, which calls for an assessment in concreto, is of critical importance. Various parameters operate when assessing whether a State has duly discharged the obligation concerned. The first, which varies greatly from one State to another, is clearly the capacity to influence effectively the action of persons likely to commit, or already committing, genocide. This capacity itself depends, among other things, on the geographical distance of the State concerned from the scene of the events, and on the strength of the political links, as well as links of all other kinds, between the authorities of that State and the main actors in the events. The State’s capacity to influence must also be assessed by legal criteria, since it is clear that every State may only act within the limits permitted by international law; seen thus, a State’s capacity to influence may vary depending on its particular legal position vis-à-vis the situations and persons facing the danger, or the reality, of genocide.’

^[13] ‘The substantive obligations arising from Articles I and III are not on their face limited by territory. They apply to a State wherever it may be acting or may be able to act in ways appropriate to meeting the obligations in question.’ Ibid., 183.

^[14] However, the breach of the duty of prevent occurs first when genocide occurs. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) Judgment 26 February 2007, 431. ‘a State can be held responsible for breaching the obligation to prevent genocide only if genocide was actually committed. It is at the time when commission of the prohibited act (genocide or any of the other acts listed in Article III of the Convention) begins that the breach of an obligation of prevention occurs. […] If neither genocide nor any of the other acts listed in Article III of the Convention are ultimately carried out, then a State that omitted to act when it could have done so cannot be held responsible a posteriori, since the event did not happen.’

^[15] Genocide determination refers to a determination made based on all evidence to inform the State’s responses. Determination of criminal accountability of an individual for his or her involvement in genocide is a determination made by a competent court in an individual case and related to the duty to punish the crime. 

^[16] See for example: WPQ from 3 November 2020. Available at: https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2020-11-03/hl9901.

^[17] Hansard, Sudan, Volume 850, 27 November 2025. Available at: https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/2025-11-27/debates/81C37BE5-A832-4CC1-A83A-A73FD1937E8C/Sudan.

^[18] Letter from Minister Ahmad to Lord Alton of Liverpool dated 23 July 2022. Ref. MC2022/16887.

^[19] See: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm5803/cmselect/cmintdev/992/report.html.

^[20] 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, 138.

^[21] Ibid., 139.

^[22] These mechanisms are discussed later in this paper.

^[23] See: https://christianpersecutionreview.org.uk/report/.

^[24] Independent report. Assessment of the implementation of recommendations of Bishop of Truro’s independent review of FCDO support for persecuted Christians (July 2022). Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/bishop-of-truros-independent-review-of-fcdo-support-for-persecuted-christians-assessment-of-recommendations-implementation/assessment-of-the-implementation-of-recommendations-of-bishop-of-truros-independent-review-of-fcdo-support-for-persecuted-christians.

^[25] Ibid.

^[26] Ibid.

^[27] Ibid.

^[28] Ibid.

^[29] UN, ‘”They came to destroy”: ISIS Crimes Against the Yazidis’ (July 2016) (A/HRC/32/CRP.2).

^[30] Ibid.

^[31] Patrick Wintour, ‘MPs unanimously declare Yazidis and Christians victims of Isis genocide’ The Guardian (20 April 2016). Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/apr/20/mps-unanimously-declare-yazidis-victims-of-isis-genocide.

^[32] See: European Parliament Resolution 2015/2599(RSP) on recent attacks and abductions by ISIS/Daesh in the Middle East, notably of Assyrians (4 February 2016), 2; John Kerry, “Remarks on Daesh and Genocide” (speech, US Department of State, Washington, DC, 17 March 2016); UK House of Commons, Daesh Genocide of Minorities Debate, Hansard, April 2016, Volume 608; Assemblee Nationale, Resolution N° 3779; Parlament, IS, systematische Massenmorde an religiösen und ethnischen Minderheiten (1808/A(E)); Tweede Kamer, “Kabinetsreactie op het gezamenlijk advies van de Commissie van advies inzake volkenrechtelijke vraag-stukken (CAVV) en de Extern Volkenrechtelijk Adviseur (EVA) over het gebruik van de term ‘genocide’ door politici,” 22 December 2017; Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, “‘They Came to Destroy’: ISIS Crimesagainst the Yazidis,” UN Doc A/HRC/32/CRP.2, 15 June 2016.

^[33] See: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-acknowledges-acts-of-genocide-committed-by-daesh-against-yazidis.

^[34] UK Border Agency, Operational Guidance Note, 2011. Available at: https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/50c84d102.pdf.

^[35] Ibid., 3.10.5.

^[36] Ibid.

^[37] Ibid., 3.10.5.

^[38] See: Minority Rights International, ‘From Crisis to Catastrophe: the situation of minorities in Iraq’ (2014). Available at: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CRC/Shared%20Documents/IRQ/INT_CRC_NGO_IRQ_19113_E.pdf.

^[39] ‘Imminent risk of Genocide in Darfur, Call for Urgent Action’, Press Release Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights, 24 November 2023, available at: https://www.raoulwallenbergcentre.org/en/news/2023-11-24.

^[40] ‘Sudan Humanitarian Update (7 September 2023)’, OCHA, 11 September 2023, available at: https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/sudan/card/WxtL7XevrB/.

^[41] ‘Sudan war turning ‘homes into cemeteries’: UNHCR’, UN News, 7 November 2023, available at: https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/11/1143317.

^[42] Ibid.

^[43] ‘Genocide: All over again in Darfur’, Inquiry into violence in Darfur since 2020 by the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Sudan and South Sudan, April 2023, available at: https://appgsudan.uk/.

^[44] ‘UN experts alarmed by reported widespread use of rape and sexual violence against women and girls by RSF in Sudan’, Press Releases Special Procedures, available at: https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/08/un-experts-alarmed-reported-widespread-use-rape-and-sexual-violence-against.

^[45] ‘’They called me a slave’: Witness testimony exposes alleged RSF-led campaign to enslave men and women in Sudan’, CNN, 20 November 2023, available at: https://edition.cnn.com/2023/11/16/africa/sudan-investigation-rsf-enslavement-intl-cmd/index.html.

^[46] Ibid.

^[47] ‘Urgent Call for Action to Prevent Genocide in Darfur’, Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights, 23 November 2023, available at: https://www.raoulwallenbergcentre.org/en/news/2023-11-23#:~:text=Crimes%20Against%20Humanity%20and%20Imminent%20Risk%20of%20Genocide%3A&text=According%20to%20survivors%20of%20these,part%2C%20according%20to%20international%20jurisprudence.

^[48] Ibid.

^[49] See: https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-icc-prosecutor-karim-khan-kc-united-nations-security-council-situation-darfur-1.

^[50] Authored by Dr Ewelina Ochab, Dr Eva Khair, Sara Sernegi and Dr Kate Ferguson.

^[51] See: https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/02/1166997.

^[52] ‘Sudan: Hallmarks of Genocide in El-Fasher Report of the independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan’, Human Rights Council 61st Session, 17 February 2026, UN Doc A/HRC/61/77.

^[53] ibid.

^[54] Newlines Institute report. See: https://newlinesinstitute.org/uyghurs/the-uyghur-genocide-an-examination-of-chinas-breaches-of-the-1948-genocide-convention/.

^[55] US Holocaust Memorial Museum report. See  https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/reports-and-resources/the-chinese-governments-assault-on-the-uyghurs.

^[56] Ibid.

^[57] Uyghur Tribunal judgement: https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Uyghur-Tribunal-Judgment-9th-Dec-21.pdf.

^[58] Ibid.

^[59] OHCHR Report. See: https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/2022-08-31/22-08-31-final-assesment.pdf.

^[60] Genocide Watch. See https://www.genocidewatch.com/single-post/genocide-emergency-ethiopia-1.

^[61] Ibid.  US Holocaust Memorial Museum. See: https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/blog/risk-of-genocide-ethiopia.

^[62] Ibid.

^[63] HRW and Amnesty International Report. See: https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/06/crimes-against-humanity-and-ethnic-cleansing-ethiopias-western-tigray-zone#_Toc100057514.

^[64] Amnesty International, Ethiopia: ‘“I don’t know if they realised I was a person”: Rape and sexual violence in the conflict in Tigray, Ethiopia’(2021). Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr25/4569/2021/en/.

^[65] ‘The Three Horsemen of the War in Tigray: Mass Killings, Sexual Violence and Starvation’, The Tigray Inquiry, September 2023, available at: https://www.davidalton.net/2023/09/29/tigray-inquiry-the-all-party-parliamentary-group-on-international-law-justice-and-accountability-has-published-a-new-report-as-part-of-an-inquiry-into-the-situation-in-tigray-since-november-20/.

^[66] ‘Ethiopia: Deteriorating human rights situation’, OHCHR Press Briefing Notes, 29 August 2023, available at: https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-briefing-notes/2023/08/ethiopia-deteriorating-human-rights-situation (accessed on 13 March 2024).

^[67] ‘Report of the International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia’, Human Rights Council 54th Session, 14 September 2023, UN Doc A/HRC/54/55.

^[68] ‘The situation of Hazara in Afghanistan’, The Hazara Inquiry, August 2022, available at: https://www.hazarainquiry.com/_files/ugd/525f48_c697e483f02c4c10a7eb04947eefb72b.pdf.

^[69] ‘Death toll tops 50 in suicide attack on female Afghan students, UN says’, France24, 3 October 2022, available at: https://www.france24.com/en/asia-pacific/20221003-death-toll-rises-in-afghan-suicide-attack-on-female-students-in-exam-centre.

^[70] ‘ICC asked to relaunch inquiry into Taliban and IS ‘war crimes’’, The Guardian, 27 September 2021, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/27/icc-asked-to-relaunch-inquiry-into-taliban-and-is-war-crimes.